Canada's Role in the Arab-Israel Peace Process Through the United Nations and Beyond

Initially, Canada had no interest, economically or militarily, in the faraway Arab-Israel region, in particular or in the Middle East, in general. However, post-Second World War, participation in the United Nations had drawn Canada into the Arab-Israel conflict, closely and emotionally. Notwithstanding its traditional position and consistent support for the State of Israel, Canada has been one of the few states that took a position in support of comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israel conflict. Its principal contribution to the Arab-Israel peace process has been in the form of Canada holding the Chair of the Refugee Working Group (RWG)-a group that was created as part of the broad multilateral Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in the 1990s. This study has made a modest effort to describe and analyze, using historical and comparative methods, Canada's diplomatic engagements with the Arab-Israel conflict and the various peace processes through the United Nations as well as multilateral peace mechanisms.

Introduction
Canada supported the cause of a Jewish homeland and voted for the creation of the State of Israel in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1948. Whatever be the reasons, Canada chose to ignore the claims and the plight of the majority Palestinians. There was a strong debate within Canadian delegation at various stages on its evolving position over the question of a separate Israel; a minority view calling support for Israel as going against the Liberal internationalist grain of Canadian foreign policy. Gradually, and in the subsequent wars after 1948, the unauthorized Israeli settlement has made a large number of Palestinians homeless and this feature became permanent. As of now, five million Palestinian refugees are registered under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees in the Near East and living in 58 refugee camps in the neighboring Arab states and surviving under poor conditions.

In its capacity as Chair and through the Refugee Working Group (RWG), Canada has been involved in organizing workshops and seminars, constructing schools and clinics in refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Canada has also been involved in the planning and implementation of a program developed by UNICEF, which concentrates on the needs of Palestinian children. Further, Canada had been a consistent contributor to UNRWA since its creation in 1949 and in recent times Justin Trudeau's government pledged $14.8 mn to the UNRWA to boost access to education, health and social service for millions of vulnerable Palestinian refugees. Thus, Canada's contribution can be assessed by more process-related considerations.

Canada's Role in the Arab-Israel Conflict and Peace Processes
In the post-Second World War period, one of the major foreign policy goals of Canada was to help maintain good relations with Britain, which many Canadians felt a strong connection with, and the US, the then emerging super power. However, participation in the United Nations had drawn Canada into the Arab-Israel conflict, closely and emotionally. There were three Israeli underground military organizations in Palestine -Haganah, Irgun and Lehi-who conducted military operations against the British Mandate killing soldiers almost every day, destroying British property and the law and order situation in Palestine breaking down. Britain sought to control it and came with several commissions-Shaw (1929), Simpson (1930), Peel (1937), and White Paper (1939) but all failed.¹ As a result, Britain handed over Palestine to the United Nations on July il 2, 1947. The first UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie (1946-52), called a special session for the creation of a Special Committee to resolve the Palestine issue. For this purpose, a First Committee (July il 28, 1947) was created and Lester B Pearson, Canadian Ambassador to the US (1945-46), who later went on to become the Secretary of State for External Affairs (1948-1957) and Prime Minister (1963-68), was elected as chairman of this Committee which created another Committee popularly known as the UNSCOP. Through the institutional means, Canada had a role in terms of UNSCOP.²

The Canadian government appointed Ivan Cleveland Rand, a former Attorney General in New Brunswick and a serving member of the Supreme Court of Canada to the 11-member UNSCOP. Justice Rand's experience during his visit to Palestine turned his sympathies towards the plight of the Jews. However, he ignored the plight of the Palestinians. On August 29, 1947, all the members of the UNSCOP met to consider the final version of its report. They considered partition as the most probable option. R G Riddell, Chief Political Adviser to the delegation in consultation with Pearson and J L Ilsley, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (1946-48), said that partition was necessary because the Arabs and the Jews were far apart and they could not and would not cooperate on common goals and could not unite within a single state. J L Ilsley, a member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, in his statement in the General Assembly on November 26, 1947, stated: "We are voting for the partition plan, because it is in our judgment the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives". Pearson was active in seeking support for votes in favor of partition in the General Assembly. Prime Minister Mackenzie King was reluctant at first to support it for fear of upsetting Britain. However, Canada voted in support of the Partition Plan in the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947; Resolution 181 was passed and ultimately a new State of Israel came into existence on May 14, 1948.³ Finally on December 24, 1948, Canada extended de facto recognition to Israel. On May 11, 1949, Canada extended its de jure recognition to Israel when Canada voted for the admission of Israel into the UN.⁴

Several variables shaped Canadian viewpoint: (i) Cultural and historical factors, rather than any liberal democratic viewpoint, shaped the Canadian views. Canada was more concerned with Britain's decision to quit the region, and the post-withdrawal consequences for the credibility of the UN. One of the members of the Canadian delegation, Elizabeth P MacCallum, was greatly disturbed by the fact that the US and Soviet viewpoints influenced Canadian approach; (ii) Many of the Canadian politicians and policy makers viewed the 'Holy Land' through their Biblical prism and their predominantly Christian heritage and became sympathetic towards the Jewish people in the wake of the then Holocaust of European Jews; and (iii) Beneath seemingly political ambiguities and low-key diplomatic approaches within and outside the UN, Canadian sympathy and support lay with the new State of Israel and whatever the western world was doing and undoing in the Middle East. One cannot call it lack of knowledge about the Middle East or lack of maturity in handling international affairs on the part of a Dominion which had just then begun dabbling in international matters. Canada was clear-headed from the very beginning; if there is any doubt, one simply need to go through the writings of Elizabeth P MacCallum. Further, the Jewish community in comparison to Arab community plays a significant role in advocating support for Israel.⁵ The Jewish community has also benefited from the sympathy many Canadian politicians have had for the persecuted Jews. Thus, the government's pro-Zionist inclinations and the work of the strong Zionist lobby shaped the policy choices which were certainly not in consonance with its evolving Liberal internationalism.

Briefly stating the various peace initiatives, Canada supported UN Security Council resolution on the first Arab-Israel war of 1948, and also the armistice agreements of 1949 that were signed between Israel and its four neighboring Arab states, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. A few points bear significance here:

(i) By the time the armistice agreements were signed in 1949, Israel had secured some 40% more territory than was allocated to the Jewish state in the UN Partition Plan; (ii) These agreements were not peace treaties, they simply stabilized the ceasefire borders without accepting them as final; and (iii) Palestine had effectively been partitioned among Israel, Egypt and Transjordan, and thus Egypt remained in occupation of the Gaza Strip; and Transjordan had taken the old city of Jerusalem and the territory of west of the Jordan River.⁶

In spite of these agreements, peace was a far cry in the Middle East. Several wars were fought; among many, 1956 Suez Canal crisis was so significant to world politics where major powers of the world got involved. Canada's engagement in this crisis was remarkable. The pretext was the nationalization of Suez Canal by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser (1956-70), who saw that the Canal was built with Egyptian labor but operated by a French company and used as the lifeline of the British Empire, and stood as a symbol of Western exploitation. By the time, Israel, France and the United Kingdom's attack on Egypt, was criticized by Washington; and Canada found itself in 'to-be' or 'not-to-be' situation between its American and British allies. Also, the Suez crisis exposed the internal clash within the Western imperialism, which destabilized the entire Arab region. To resolve the differences in the Western alliance and avoid the broader crisis, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (Foreign Minister) Lester Pearson (1948-1957) proposed the creation and deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai and the proposal was accepted. The Canadian forces subsequently served in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was commanded for a period by a Canadian Lieutenant General E L M Burns. The idea of the UN peacekeeping force is one of the great innovations under the UN system, a novel tool in the arsenal of diplomacy that allows negotiations to prevail over conflict. Pearson's idea allowed all combatants to save face by withdrawing their own forces and allowing the peacekeepers, while not having to admit defeat at the hands of the other side. Pearson won the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to both resolving the Suez crisis and the development of UN peacekeeping force.⁷

Meanwhile, after the 1949 armistice agreement, the next important agreement was the Egypt-Israel Peace treaty of 1979. It was the first time that an Arab state recognized Israel. After this agreement too, hostility increased in the Middle East. Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian President was assassinated; first Intifada (Palestinian uprising-started with passive resistance, boycott and ended with pelting stones) started. In the 1990s, the international scenario was marked by the end of Cold War and the Gulf War. With the US initiative, multilateral peace process started in the 1990s and the role of Canada was visible during this phase.

The reason behind the multilateral peace process in the 1990s was to facilitate progress at the bilateral level by involving neighboring Arab states and the expertise of the international community where they could discuss what are technically considered non-political issues of mutual concern that would serve as confidence-building measures between the parties. Whereas the bilaterals would deal with the problems inherited from the past, the multilaterals would focus on the future shape of the Middle East. It included the issues of water, refugee issues, environment, economic development and other subjects of mutual interest.⁸

Regarding Canada's participation in the multilaterals, when Canada was asked to chair the group on refugees, there were concerns that this might be drawing Canada into one of the most contentious issues between the parties. Reluctantly, due to the US approach, Canada agreed to serve as the chair of the RWG. Thus, Canada became involved by assuming the role of chairmanship, what they called 'gavel-holder' of the newly established RWG, which was crystallized in Moscow conference in January 1992 as part of the architecture of the overall Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Canada as the 'gavel-holder' of the RWG became involved in over 100 specific activities including workshops and seminars on various themes, construction of schools and clinics in refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Canadian government encouraged and supported academic discussion of the refugee issue with conferences in Canada followed by ones in the UK and elsewhere. The purpose of these were to explore the options on the questions related to return, compensation, institutional change, the future of the UNRWA and so forth.⁹

At the time of the creation of the RWG, over half of all the Palestinians lived in exile. The 'Right of Return' was the central demand of the Palestinians and they cited the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948 which calls for refugees to be allowed to return to their homes and compensation to be paid for the loss of property. Israel resisted it and viewed the RWG as a forum for discussing the humanitarian aspects of the Palestinian refugees.

By this time, the Oslo Accords of 1993 provided mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and laid the foundations for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As part of the Oslo Accord, the final agreement was signed on September 28, 1995. It came to be referred to as Oslo II. Oslo II divided the West Bank into three zones; Area A, B and C, and specified a phased redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from each zone and the extent of power was to vary from zone to zone. The clauses of Oslo II pushed the Palestinians into Bantustan-like enclaves, encircled by a massive wall, had their water, land appropriated, and were subjected to daily humiliation at the military check points. Again peace did not follow the Oslo Accords. Hamas rejected the Oslo peace process, which manifested in suicide bombings against the Israelis. On the other side Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995 for signing the Oslo Accords. Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of the Likud coalition, came to power in June 1996 elections who had campaigned on a pledge to 'slow down' the peace process. The Hamas activities, assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the emergence of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of the Likud coalition finally led to the suspension of the peace process.¹⁰

The bilateral dynamics of the peace process of the Oslo Accords had an impact on the multilateral peace process. Any resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue touched upon vital national interests of Arab host countries, in particular, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon where most of the refugees lived. Both Syria and Lebanon boycotted the RWG meetings, seeing them as 'normalization' with Israel. Further, events like terrorist bombings in Jerusalem, Ashkelon and Tel Aviv; Israel's war with Lebanon; the opening of the tunnel under Al Aqsa mosque; and Israel's beginning of construction in the West Bank settlement of Har Homa, etc., made it difficult to maintain the multilateral process and by July il 1997 it had largely withered.¹¹

Although there are shortfalls of the RWG, it offered the parties a sole forum within the framework of the peace process where the interests of the Palestinians outside Gaza and the West Bank had been voiced and the parties have been forced to start thinking constructively. The RWG has provided logistical support on a demographic survey of the West Bank and Gaza to the newly established Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The RWG has provided support for emergency housing in Lebanon; health clinics, vocational training centers and emergency housing in Syria; and secondary schools, maternal and child healthcare and vocational training centers in Jordan. The RWG, through the work of Sweden, has been involved in the planning and implementation of a program developed by UNICEF, which concentrates on the needs of Palestinian children.

Further, between 1994 and 2000, Canada funded a program to relocate Palestinian refugees from 'Canada Camp' in Egypt to Gaza. Briefly about the 'Canada Camp'; in the early 1970s, some areas of the Israeli-occupied Gaza near Rafah were cleared for road construction. The Palestinian residents of that area were relocated to the then Israeli occupied Sinai to a camp formerly occupied by a Canadian contingent of the UNEF. Hence, the name 'Canada Camp'. After the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 and the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, the border with Egypt was restored. Rafah was then divided into two areas. Most of the 'Canada Camp' fell within the Egyptian part of Rafah, leaving 496 Palestinian families effectively stranded and separated from their families and relatives in Gaza. Egypt was to provide funding to build new homes and Israel would provide serviced plots of land in the Tel El-Sultan of Rafah district in Gaza. But the program was interrupted due to financial constraints after only 133 families were relocated. In 1994, Canada took the lead in relocating the remaining 363 families from the 'Canada Camp'. Through donations to UNRWA, Canada and Kuwait provided each family with $12,000 to build home in Tel El-Sultan and services were provided by the Palestinian Authority. By the end of 2000, all the families from Canada camp had been repatriated to the Gaza Strip and mostly were housed in the Tel El-Sultan housing project. In addition, Canada also provided funds for the construction of a community center in Tel El-Sultan for the benefit of the returning families.¹²

While mentioning about Canada's role in the working group, it had a politically valuable domestic component. Canada had done Israel a favor by agreeing to chair the RWG. To the pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab Canadians, Canada devoted its resources and energy for this endeavor. Whatever that would count as an achievement, the fact is that lack of effective progress on the bilateral negotiations, multilateral negotiations on refugees were paralyzed as well.¹³ Nevertheless, RWG received the attention of the international community and supported increased funding for UNRWA. Not to forget, Canada had been a consistent contributor to UNRWA since its creation in 1949 to 2012, when it was cut by the Stephen Harper government. It is argued that Harper is a social and fiscal conservative with a deeply religious orientation - a strong supporter of Israel. Canada, under Harper, became the first country to suspend all aid to the Palestinian Authority in the wake of Hamas' victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006.¹⁴ Further, in July 2006, Harper declared Canada's unequivocal support for Israel's devastating bombing campaign against the Hezbollah in Lebanon.¹⁵ However, just after coming to power Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has reinstated its aid and his government pledged $14.8 mn to the UNRWA to boost access to education, health and social services for millions of vulnerable Palestinian refugees. On the question of peace process in the 1990s and Canada's role therein, if judged only on the question of whether Canada in some way contributed towards the resolution of the conflict, its direct contribution is found to be limited. However, Canada's contribution through multilateral mechanisms especially in terms of handling the question of Palestinian refugees remains significant. Canada's role in the RWG indicate that Canada remained engaged in the Arab-Israel peace process. Because the Palestinian refugees are the direct product of the Palestine-Israel conflict and RWG emerged as part of the broad MEPP. Thus, Canada's achievement in keeping the working group relatively active and visible in that period must, therefore, be assessed by more process-related considerations.

Conclusion
To sum up, Canada supported the Jews cause and voted in the UNSCOP majority plan that created the State of Israel in 1948 and ignored the plight of the majority Palestinians. Canada's perception and policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict have been shaped by the Canadian political leadership and religio-cultural and historical factors rather than its acclaimed Liberal internationalism. Traditionally, Canada supports Israel; only from the 1980s to the 2000s, Canada adopted a more nuanced and balanced approach towards the conflict. Since the creation of the State of Israel, thousands of Palestinians have been displaced and forced to leave their homes and become refugees. Palestinian refugees are registered and surviving under UNRWA in the Near East and scattered in different refugee camps in the neighboring Arab countries. Canada has been a consistent contributor to UNRWA since its creation in 1949 to 2012.

Internationally, in the 1990s multilateral as well as bilateral (OSLO) peace process was initiated. The RWG was created as part of the multilateral peace process. The bilateral dynamics of the peace process tended to overshadow the multilateral peace process. Yet, in its capacity of chairing the RWG, Canada served the cause of the Palestinian refugees by organizing workshops, bringing the parties together for discussion and providing assistance to the refugees in the camps.

The peace process has not been successful and several issues have been left unresolved. These are: (i) The issue of Palestinian refugees: about five million Palestinian refugees are registered under UNRWA and mostly live in 58 refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and they are sustained by the international donors; (ii) Right to return of the Palestinian refugees to their homeland; (iii) Violation of human rights of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation: arrest, imprisonment, administrative detention, aerial bombing on the civilians; and (iv) Above all, the creation of a Palestinian State, where the Hamas controls the Gaza and Al-Fatah controls the West Bank. Palestinians are isolated and divided by the construction of a 703 km physical barrier and checkpoints strictly controlled by IDF. Canada's involvement has been to contribute to efforts towards a sustainable peace in the Arab-Israel conflict, either through international organizations or regional peace process initiatives. Yet, unless the above-mentioned Palestinian issues are resolved, sustainable peace in the region is a distant dream.

1. T G Fraser (1995), The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 17, Macmillan Press Limited, London; and William L Cleveland and Martin Bunton (2009), A History of the Modern Middle East, 4th Edition, p. 262, Westview Press, USA.
2. UNSCOP Report (1947), United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, Vol. 1, A/364, 3 Sept 1947, New York, available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF. Accessed on February 20, 2016; and David J Bercuson (1985), Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 54, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
3. Ibid.
4. John A Munro and Alex I Inglis (Eds.) (1973), Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson 1948-1957, Vol. 2, pp. 216-217, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
5. David J Bercuson (1985), Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 233, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
6. Hassan Bin Talal (Crown Prince of Jordan) (1981), Palestinian Self-Determination: A Study of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, pp. 37-40, Quartet Books Ltd., London.
7. James Eayrs (1957), "Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis", International Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, Canadian International Council, available at http://www. jstor.org/stable/40198266. Accessed on July il 20, 2012; and Cleveland and Bunton (2009), op. cit., p. 339.
8. Rex Brynen (2007), "Canada's Role in the Israeli-Palestine Peace Process", in Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Eds.), Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Canada.
9. Joel Peters (1997), "The Multilateral Arab-Israel Peace Talks and the Refugee Working Group", Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 321-329, available at http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org. Accessed on June 10, 2015; and Andrew Robinson (2011), "Canada's Credibility as an Actor in the Middle East Peace Process: The Refugee Working Group, 1992-2000", International Journal, Summer, Vol. 66, No. 3,pp. 696-699.
10. Barak Oren (2005), "The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 6, p. 727, Sage Publications, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042415. Accessed on July il 09, 2011 p. 727; and Cleveland and Bunton (2009), op. cit., p. 506.
11. Etel Solingen (2000), "The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Negotiations: Genesis, Institutionalization, Pause, Future", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 181, Sage Publications, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/424919. Accessed on October 23, 2015.
12. Global Affairs Canada (2016), "Middle East Peace Process", available at http://www.international.gc.ca/nameanmo/peace_processprocessus_paix/canada_camp. Accessed on January 18, 2017.
13. Solingen (2000), op. cit., p. 182; and Robinson (2011), op. cit., pp 702, 717.
14. Marie-Joelle Zahar (2007), "Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreneurship and Canada's Foreign Policy in the Middle East", in Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Eds.), Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice, p. 61, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Canada.
15. Patrick Martin (2010), "Canada and the Middle East", in Fen Osler and Paul Heinbecker (Eds.), Canada Among Nations 2009-2010: As Others See Us, p. 198, McGill Queens University Press, Montreal.

Reference # 55J-2018-07-03-01